We investigated mental representations of body parts and body-related activities in two subjects with congenitally absent limbs (one with, the other without phantom sensations), a wheelchair sports group of paraplegic participants, and two groups of participants with intact limbs. To analyse mental representation structures, we applied Structure Dimensional Analysis. Verbal labels indicating body parts and related activities were presented in randomized lists that had to be sorted according to a hierarchical splitting paradigm. Participants were required to group the items according to whether or not they were considered related, based on their own body perception. Results of the groups of physically intact and paraplegic participants revealed separate clusters for the lower body, upper body, Wngers and head. The participant with congenital phantom limbs also showed a clear separation between upper and lower body (but not between Wngers and hands). In the participant without phantom sensations of the absent arms, no such modularity emerged, but the speciWc practice of his right foot in communication and daily routines was reXected. Sorting verbal labels of body parts and activities appears a useful method to assess body representation in individuals with special body anatomy or function and leads to conclusions largely compatible with other assessment procedures.
Introduction
The topic of body representations and their classiWcation has long stirred vivid discussions. Terms such as "body schema" and "body image" have been used by many authors since the beginning of the twentieth century, mostly based on neurological patient studies (for review, see Corradi-Dell'Acqua and Rumiati 2007). Head and Holmes (1911) originally deWned body schema as a dynamic model of one's own actual posture. Later authors emphasized the importance to diVerentiate between body schema and body image, with the former being a postural body frame mainly based on proprioception, and the latter a predominately visually informed, conscious representation of the body. This dyadic taxonomy has been developed based on evidence from diVerent levels (e.g., Gallagher 2005; Paillard 1999; Dijkerman and de Haan 2007) , and has been used by several authors in a rather non-unitary way (see de Vignemont 2010) . In addition, triadic taxonomies have been presented, for example by Sirigu et al. (1991) , who distinguished the sensorimotor body schema from a visuospatial body structural description and conceptual body semantics. In order to demonstrate a triple dissociation between body schema, body structural description and body image based on data from neurological patients, Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) tested stroke patients in speciWc tasks for each type of body representation (body schema: imagery, hand laterality; body structural description: localization; body image: functional matching). Results showed dissociation between the three suggested categories, but also a double dissociation between the two body schema tasks. Based on behavioural and neurological data, the authors concluded that knowledge about the human body consists of functionally dissociable representations. Evidence for neural correlates of diVerent types of body representations has also been obtained in brain imaging studies (e.g., Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al. 2008 ; see also Berlucchi and Aglioti 2010) . Giummarra et al. (2007) emphasize the role of body schema in generating actions, suggesting that proprioceptive, somatosensory, vestibular and visual systems as well as the motor system including eVerence copies provide the major contributions to its properties. These authors also point to the predominant role of the parietal cortex, especially the superior parietal lobule, the temporo-parietal junction and parieto-insular connections, in generating the body schema, and in mapping peripersonal space in egocentric frames of reference, i.e. relative to one's own body or parts of it. De Vignemont (2010) also emphasizes the actionrelated character of the concept of body schema and proposes to deWne it based on its function in action guidance.
In order to provide meaningful criteria for the clariWcation of the concept of body schema, Haggard and Wolpert (2005) have deWned body schema as the "central representation of the body's spatial properties, that includes the length of limb segments, their hierarchical arrangement, the conWguration of the segments in space and the shape of the body surface". According to Haggard and Wolpert (2005) , this central representation is characterized by seven main properties. They describe body schema as spatially coded, modular (i.e., integrating diVerent schemata, e.g. for upper and lower extremities), continuously updated with movement, adaptable to changes in properties of the body and body parts, supramodal, coherent, and interpersonal. The latter characteristic, interpersonality, suggests a close integration of interoceptive information of one's own body and the visual perception of the bodies of others. In an earlier review, Berlucchi and Aglioti (1997) argued that body schema also involves mnemonic and imaginative components.
Based on evidence from numerous studies that showed physical activity and activity observed in others to share common neural correlates (e.g., Sebanz et al. 2003; Grèzes and Decety 2001) , Funk et al. (2005) referred to body schema as multimodal representation of the body that explicitly includes the aspect of visual inXuence of observed human body dynamics, which is likely to play an important role in the generation of phantom limbs. Phantom sensations in amputees have been described as being caused by persisting activity in neural network components after the loss of a body part, and the erroneous integration of this activity in the generation of a contingent body schema (Berlucchi and Aglioti 1997) . Aplasic phantoms perceived by persons with congenitally missing limbs have been reported by several authors, and diVerent theories regarding their genesis have been put forward (see Brugger and Funk 2007; Hilti and Brugger 2009) . One theory presented by Price (2006) takes diVerent prenatal and postnatal factors into account, including muscle activity and sensory and proprioceptive feedback in utero, visual experience of observing intact limb movements in other persons, and prosthesis usage in early life. Based on Berlucchi and Aglioti (1997) , Giummarra et al. (2007) noted that "the brain may be genetically predisposed to represent a prototypical human body, regardless of the correspondence or lack thereof between the ideal model and the actual body". They state that phantom limb sensations in subjects with congenitally absent limbs may evolve from the habitual observation of limb movements in other people and the continued activation of an innate boy schema. These authors thus signiWcantly extended earlier, more anecdotal, notions of a genetic basis of congenital phantom limbs (Abramson and Feibel 1981) .
The present study set out to analyze mental representations of body parts and related activities in two subjects with congenitally missing limbs. One of these individuals, A.Z., was born without forearms and legs, and perceived phantoms of all four limbs as long as she can remember. She also frequently uses these phantoms actively to imagine and simulate movements (Brugger et al. 2000) . The other individual, C.L., is also born without hands and arms, and has two shortened legs with only one functionally intact foot. Importantly, C.L. has never experienced any phantom sensations.
Previous behavioural studies have revealed signiWcant diVerences between these two individuals (Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) , which suggest that phantom sensations of limbs that have never been physically experienced can serve as a substrate for motor activity and related perceptual eVects in the same way as the lifelong use of physically intact limbs. In a study of apparent limb motion (ShiVrar and Freyd 1990), A.Z. showed results comparable to normally limbed controls, but C.L. did not (Funk et al. 2005; Brugger and Funk 2007) . In a mental rotation task with hand stimuli, A.Z. showed prolonged reaction times for hands depicted in rotation angles corresponding to awkward postures (Parsons 1994 ), whereas C.L. did not show this eVect (Funk and Brugger 2008) . In an implicit reaching task (Cooper and Shepard 1975; Parsons et al. 1995) , A.Z., like intact-limbed control subjects, showed signiWcantly longer reaction times in trials that involved mental rotation than in the other trials (Brugger et al. 2000) . These results were interpreted as evidence for the experience of phantom limbs to constrain both dynamic and static visual limb observation as much as sensorimotor experiences with real limbs. Additionally, A.Z.'s phantom limb awareness was investigated using fMRI and TMS (Brugger et al. 2000) . Brain areas that were active during A.Z.'s movements of her phantom Wngers and hands included the bilateral dorsal premotor cortex, supplementary motor area, superior parietal cortex, but not the primary motor and primary somatosensory areas of hand representation. In the TMS study, stimulation of areas in the premotor and parietal cortex elicited slow movement sensations of the contralateral Wngers and hand, but typically from a much larger area of the cortex than in healthy subjects. Together, these results elucidated A.Z.'s cognitive and neural correlates of phantom sensations and conWrmed the reality of congenital phantoms over and beyond the mere phenomenal level.
We also investigated a group of paraplegic subjects and two groups of subjects with physically intact bodies, but diVering in their level of physical activity: a group of sports students and a control group (matched to A.Z. and C.L. in age and occupation). The SDA method (Structure Dimensional Analysis; Lander and Lange 1996; Schack 2004a Schack , 2010 has previously been applied to investigate mental representations of complex movements in the long term memory of athletes (e.g., Schack and Mechsner 2006) and dancers (Bläsing et al. 2009 ). Our aim was to investigate how diVerent physical conditions, including the rare case of congenital phantoms, and resulting modes of physical activity would shape cognitive body representation. De Vignemont (2010) has put forward that body schema is exploited by the motor system at diVerent stages of action programming, action prediction and sensory feedback to inform forward and inverse models in the motor control system. In accordance with this view, our perspective is based on the assumption that the multimodal information used for the learning of complex movements also underlies the updating of an action-based body representation.
Methods

Subjects
We tested two individuals, A.Z. and C.L., who were both born with incomplete arms and legs, a group of participants of recreational wheelchair sports teams and two groups of physically intact subjects (see Table 1 ). A.Z. (aged 54 at the time of the study) has been born with tetramelia and perceived phantoms of all four limbs as long as she can remember. Due to this rare condition, A.Z. has taken part in several previous studies (Brugger et al. 2000; Brugger and Funk 2007; Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) . C.L. (aged 45 at the time of the study) has been born without arms; his legs are shortened and altered in shape (he is unable to walk). He uses his right foot (that is more moveable than the left one) for everyday activities such as grasping objects, writing with a pen, drinking from a cup etc., as well as for pointing and gesturing. C.L. has never experienced any phantom limbs in his life. Like A.Z., he has also taken part in previous studies (Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) .
Six additional participants (one woman) were recruited from among two recreational wheelchair sports teams (basketball and table tennis; average age: 48.5 § 10.4 years). All of them were paralyzed as a consequence of accident (N = 5, average age at the time of the accident: 20.6 § 5.2 years) or meningitis during infancy (N = 1). None of them had lost a limb in the accident, or had been born paralyzed or with incomplete limbs, and none of them had ever experienced phantom sensations. Individual conditions of sensorimotor functioning, carefully assessed in medical interviews, are summarized in Table 2 .
As controls, we tested two groups of participants with intact bodies, but of diVerent age and physical activity level. The Wrst group consisted of persons comparable to A.Z. and C.L. with respect to age and occupation (mostly university staV, N = 12, 6 women; average age: 46.8 § 10.1 years), the other group consisted of sport students (N = 18, 10 women; average age: 24.2 § 2.4 years).
All participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. The study has been performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
Mental representations of the body were measured using SDA (Lander and Lange 1996; Schack 2004a Schack , 2010 . Body parts and limb-related activities were repeatedly presented to the participants in randomized verbal lists. These had to be sorted according to a hierarchical splitting paradigm. The labels used were eye, forehead, mouth, thumb, index Wnger, elbow, shoulder, chest, hip, knee, heel, big toe, talking, writing, pointing, walking (actual labels were given in German: Auge, Stirn, Mund, Daumen, ZeigeWnger, Ellenbogen, Schulter, Brust, Hüfte, Knie, Ferse, Großzehe, reden, schreiben, zeigen, gehen) . These labels are referred to as "concepts" henceforth. During the experiment, the participants were sitting in front of a laptop computer. They performed the splitting task by sorting the concepts presented on the screen according to their subjective closeness to the Wrst item in the list, the current anchor. This anchor was always displayed in white font and highlighted by a red bar; the active item was displayed in yellow font and the remaining concepts in black font. Participants were explicitly instructed to rely on the perception of their own body when making their decisions. Concepts which the participant judged to be "closely related" to the anchor were shifted to a "related list" on the left side of the screen, while concepts regarded as "not closely related" were shifted to an "unrelated list" located on the right side of the screen. After splitting a list into two sets (a related and an unrelated list), these two sets were displayed separately and the subjects could choose whether they wanted to accept or split them into further subsets. After Wnishing the splitting of each and every list, the participants were required to conWrm this step by pressing a key to proceed. The experiment was completed after conWrmation of the last list.
Participants A.Z. and C.L. and two participants from the wheelchair sports group did not press the keys themselves, as all other participants did. They rather informed the experimenter to which of the lists they wanted an item to be sorted, whereupon the experimenter pressed the corresponding key. Because of these diVerences in data acquisition, decision times were not measured, and participants were informed that time did not matter. Irrespective of the two response modalities, it took participants approximately 30 min to complete the entire experiment.
SDA method
The relational structure of the body representation was obtained by SDA (Lander and Lange 1996; Schack 2004a Schack , 2010 . This cluster analytic method consists of four steps: First, a special splitting procedure involving a multiple sorting task delivers a distance scaling between the concepts of a predetermined set. Second, a hierarchical cluster analysis is used to transform each set of concepts into a hierarchical structure. Third, a factor analysis reveals the dimensions in this structured set of concepts, and fourth, the cluster solutions are tested for invariance within and between groups. (Psychometric details of the procedure are provided by Schack 2001) . In more global terms, the four steps of the analysis are characterized as follows:
The experimental procedure started by collecting information on the representational distance between selected concepts (Step 1). This was achieved through the application of the previously described splitting technique in an experimental setting (see "Procedure") in which participants were asked to judge the functional relationship between two concepts (see, e.g., Schack 2004a). Each concept (body-part) was oVered as an anchor (i.e., reference object), to which the remaining N-1 concepts were either classiWed or de-classiWed according to an individually chosen similarity criterion. This procedure continued with the emerging (positive or negative) partial quantities by retaining the reference object (anchor) until an individual discontinuance criterion per participant was reached. By this procedure, N-decision trees were established, as each concept occupied once the reference position. Subsequently, the algebraic branch sums were determined on the partial quantities per decision tree, submitted to a Z-transformation for standardization, and Wnally combined into a Z-matrix. This matrix formed the starting point of all further analyses. Hence, the SDA method does not ask the subjects to give explicit statements regarding their representation structures, but rather reveals this structure by means of knowledge-based decisions in an experimental setting. To guarantee that all perceptual features of the concepts are included in the decision process, the given method oVers the possibility to explore action-based body representations physically and mentally in the context of the decision by performing or mentally simulating body movements; this is done in order to account for the inherent links between the motor and cognitive components of the concepts.
To measure in a second step the hierarchical structure of representation, the Z-Matrix was transferred into a Euclidian distance matrix as basis for a hierarchic cluster analysis (in accordance with the average-linkage-method). This resulted in individual cluster solutions on the N-concepts formed as dendrograms. Each cluster solution was established by determining an incidental Euclidian distance (d crit ), with all junctures lying below this value forming the apical pole of an underlying concept cluster.
For the purpose of a dimension analysis (the third step of the SDA), the Z-matrix is transformed into a correlation matrix, which then provides the data basis for an (orthogonal) factor analysis with a subsequent cluster-oriented rotation procedure. The result is a factor matrix classiWed according to the concept clusters.
In a fourth step, to measure inter-individual or intergroup diVerences between representation structures, the constructed individual cluster solutions were examined pair-wise for their structural invariance. A structural invariance measure was determined based on three deWned values: the number of constructed clusters of the pair-wise cluster solutions, the number of elements (concepts) within the constructed clusters, and the average quantities of the constructed clusters. The value was calculated as the square root of the product of the weighted arithmetic means of the relative average quantities of the constructed clusters and the proportional number of clusters in the compared cluster solutions. In the present analysis, a diVerential threshold was deWned as 0 = 0.68 (i.e., two structures were declared invariant if they possessed a value higher than 0 ; note that 0 value is not a statistical probability value, but a critical value). As a result of the invariance analysis, an invariance matrix was established to indicate the similarity between the representation structures of the diVerent groups and/or individuals (for more detailed information on the method, see Schack 2001 Schack , 2010 .
Results
Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis ( = 1%, d crit = 4.59) via SDA method are summarized in Table 3 , displayed as dendrograms in Fig. 1 , and further illustrated in Fig. 2 .
The group dendrogram of the age-matched control group features four clusters (Fig. 1a) . The Wrst cluster contains concepts of body parts of the head (eye, mouth, forehead) together with the activity talking. The second cluster contains concepts of body parts of the trunk (chest, shoulder). The third cluster contains concepts of body parts of the hand (thumb, index Wnger) together with the activity writing. The fourth cluster contains concepts of body parts of the lower limb (big toe, heel, knee and hip) together with the activity walking. The concepts elbow and pointing have been singled out, which means that they were connected to other concepts above the signiWcance level.
The cluster solution of the group of sport students (Fig. 1b) diVers slightly from the one of the control group. It also shows four clusters that relate to body parts of the head, hand (Wngers), upper limb and lower limb. A diVerence to the cluster solution of the control group occurs in the third cluster that in this case relates to body parts of the upper limb rather than the trunk, with shoulder and elbow being included and chest being singled out. Unlike in the control group, the concept pointing is included in the Wnger cluster.
The group of participants in wheelchairs (Fig. 1c) has produced a cluster solution that shows only small diVerences from that of the group of sport students: the head cluster is separated into two clusters of two concepts each, consisting of eye and forehead, and mouth and talking.
In the cluster solution of A.Z. (Fig. 1d) , the head is also represented in two clusters, the Wrst consisting of the concepts eye and writing, the second mouth and talking. The third cluster contains the concepts shoulder and chest, the fourth elbow, thumb, and index Wnger. The Wfth cluster consists of the body parts of the lower limb, hip, knee, big toe, heel, and walking. The concepts forehead and pointing are singled out.
The cluster solution produced by C.L. (Fig. 1e) consists of three clusters that diVer largely from the clusters produced by A.Z. and the other participant groups, with no separation between upper and lower limb concepts. The largest cluster contains the concepts forehead, mouth, chest, big toe, talking, pointing and writing. The second cluster contains eye and shoulder and the third cluster index Wnger, hip and walking. The concepts heel, knee, thumb and elbow are singled out.
Results of the invariance analysis between groups show that none of the cluster solutions are invariant from each other, all values are below 0 = 0.68. In the following, we compare the cluster solutions for similarity based on their structural invariance values. The results of the control group and of the sport students' group show a high similarity ( = 0.57) and so do the results of the sport students and those of the wheelchair group ( = 0.61). A.Z.'s results are slightly more similar to those of the control group ( = 0.48) than are C.L.'s results ( = 0.44) and those of the wheelchair group ( = 0.41). The results of A.Z. and C.L. show the lowest structural similarity ( = 0.36).
Discussion
The results of our study reveal diVerent cluster solutions for all Wve groups or individuals, respectively. Even though none of the cluster solutions are invariant from each other, the qualitative diVerences between the cluster solutions are striking especially when regarded in the context of the physical conditions and modes of activity of the experimental subjects. Concepts: 1 shoulder; 2 elbow; 3 thumb; 4 index Wnger; 5 hip; 6 knee; 7 heel; 8 big toe; 9 chest; 10 forehead; 11 mouth; 12 eye; 13 walking; 14 writing; 15 pointing; 16 talking
Modularity of body representation
The cluster solutions of the two groups of physically intact persons and those of the wheelchair group resemble each other, with one cluster for the lower limbs including the activity walking, one cluster for the Wngers and manual activities, one cluster (separated into two in the wheelchair group) for the head and talking, and one cluster for the trunk and upper limbs. Such modularity has been proposed by Haggard and Wolpert (2005) as one of the main characteristics of body schema. By modularity, the authors understand the fact that diVerent body parts are represented in diVerent neural circuits and organized in a modular network to represent postures of the whole body. One of the most distinctive features of this modularity is the separation between upper and lower body in body schema (Reed and Farah 1995) . In the wheelchair group, this modularity still exists even though in these participants, the functionality of the lower part of their bodies has been severely impaired for a long time (see Table 2 : 31 § 4.1 years since incident, i.e. since youth and in one case even since early childhood-note that the cluster solution of the latter individual did not show decreased modularity compared to the other participants). Interestingly, a separation between upper and lower body was also reXected in A.Z.'s cluster solution, even though she completely lacks lower body parts (knee, heel, big toe, walking) and has no forearms, hands and Wngers. In this respect, applying the concept of a modular body schema according to Haggard and Wolpert (2005) and conclusions drawn from them regarding our results, we interpret A.Z.'s modular body representation, especially her upper/lower limb modularity, as a consequence of her vivid and enduring phantom limbs.
In contrast to the subjects with intact functional hands, A.Z. did not show a common cluster for thumb, index Wnger, and related activities, despite of her phantom hands and Wngers that otherwise displayed various characteristics of intact hands (Brugger et al. 2000; Hilti and Brugger 2009 ). This Wnding can be interpreted in the context of the idea of a distinct Wnger schema as it has been proposed by Benton (1959) and corroborated by clinical studies of Wnger agnosia (e.g., Kinsbourne and Warrington 1962; Anema et al. 2008) . Haggard et al. (2006) have found experimental evidence for a somatotopic representation of the Wngers diVerent from the body schema in which the hand as a whole is represented. The latter is based on external spatial locations that are updated during body movements (Haggard and Wolpert 2005), whereas the Wnger schema relies on somatotopic skin space. This could account for an explanation why the diVerentiation of hand module and Wnger module does not occur in A.Z.'s results: while her congenital phantoms may provide her with a complete body schema that includes all four limbs, the absence of tactile aVerences from her Wngers would prevent her from developing a dissociable Wnger schema.
Deviation from modular body representation C.L., who, in contrast to A.Z., has never experienced any phantom sensations, shows a structure that deviates largely from the modular structure found in the cluster solutions of the groups. In C.L.'s cluster solution, the concept big toe is integrated with concepts of the head and upper body (mouth, forehead, chest) and activity concepts related to head and hand (talking, writing, pointing) . This conceptualization of the big toe is consistent with C.L.'s speciWc way of using his right foot for "manual" and communicative activities, such as writing and gesturing. It can therefore be argued, that C.L.'s cluster solution clearly represents his action-based body representation shaped by his personal way of using his body parts for actions, especially by the application of his right foot as a functional hand. This result brings to mind that adaptability, additional to modularity, is another main characteristic of body schema proposed by Haggard and Wolpert (2005) . This feature relates to gradual changes in spatial properties, such as changes in the size of body parts over life time, or adaptation to loss of body parts. In C.L.'s case, adaptability-in terms of a functional adaptation to his bodily condition and use of body partsseems to have the potential to override modularity. Interestingly, this was not the case for the participants of the wheelchair group, whose bodily functionality has been rather reduced than fundamentally changed. It appears that neither extensive exercise (as in the sports students) nor paraplegia or non-functionality of whole body parts (as in the wheelchair group) has the potential to modify the modular body representation, whereas a qualitative functional switch in the use of body parts (as in C.L.) has this potential. We see this result as evidence for a strong interaction of action-based and conceptual body representations on a functional level-a view that is not consistent with the notion of completely separable body schema and body image and/or body structural description. It could be argued that, in this respect, C.L.'s cluster solution that integrates index Wnger with concepts of the lower body, hip and walking, seems somehow inconsistent. When asked about this result, however, C.L. commented that, in his personal reference, the label index Wnger corresponds to his second toe, whereas the label big toe refers to his real big toe that he actually uses as thumb (note that the concept thumb had been singled out).
In favour of the view that an action-based body representation should not only involve the coding of one's own actual body posture, but also the long-term representation of one's own body, Carruthers (2008a Carruthers ( , 2008b suggests to distinguish between "online" and "oZine" representations of the body that mutually inXuence each other, with online representations informing oZine representations and oZine representations providing a framework for the construction of online representations. This is supported by Gazzola et al. (2007) , whose brain imaging study revealed that aplasic subjects missing both hands activated brain areas involved in mouth or foot movements when watching hand actions. As the experimental task applied in our study involves oZine rather than online representations, the results give some evidence for C.L.'s, but not A.Z.'s, body representation reXecting an inXuence of online representations of his actual and acting physical body.
Recent studies by de Vignemont et al. (2009) provide evidence that body representation might already be structured into categorical body parts on the level of tactile integration. Their results corroborate the view of de Vignemont et al. (2005) , who have suggested two diVerent types of body mereology, a somatosensory one that relies on body part categories separated by joints acting as category boundaries, and a motor mereology that relies on motor synergies in which the boundary eVect is reduced by action. The authors suggest that the relative overestimation of cross-joint distances observed in their study arises partly from perceptual categorization of body parts, which means that categorization eVects inXuence perception at an early level in the processing of tactile stimuli. Regarding C.L.'s body representation and apparent inconsistency of his subjective way of labelling his second toe as "index Wnger" and his big toe (his functional thumb) as "big toe" rather than "thumb", it would be interesting to investigate how, in C.L. and persons with similar bodily conditions, body part concepts are modulated due to individual use and activity, and how this might inXuence tactile and proprioceptive perception.
Measuring body representations via SDA
As the paradigm used here relies on verbal (or, in other studies, pictorial) labels, it could be argued that, using such a method to trigger body representations, we could not get access to the level of action-related body schema but exclusively to the level of body structural description or body image (Sirigu et al. 1991; Schwoebel and Coslett 2005) . Regarding this issue, it has to be explained why we assume that the method we used does have the potential to give us, at least partly, access to the memory structures that underlie limb motor actions rather that to mere semantic knowledge. The SDA method has previously been applied for analysing cognitive structures in long-term memory, for example in studies of movement expertise in athletes (e.g., Schack 2004a; Schack and Mechsner 2006) and dancers (Bläsing et al. 2009 ), in rehabilitation studies (Braun et al. 2007 ), as well as in studies of other types of expert knowledge (Schack 2004b ). The split procedure as integral part of the SDA method represents a psychometric approach to determine individual proximity measures. Proximity data are acquired successively by multilateral, multiple sorting of items, which allows for an extremely Wne grading in proximity scaling. In a study by Reed et al. (2004) , a sorting task was applied in which cards with pictures of human body parts had to be assigned to two, three, four and a free number of categories. In contrast to the SDA's hierarchical splitting process that is based on multiple pair-wise comparisons, subjects in the study by Reed et al. (2004) performed only one sorting procedure for the whole stimulus set per instruction. Furthermore, in Reed's study, the number of categories was mostly given in the instructions and therefore inXuenced the participants' sorting process, whereas in SDA, the number of clusters solely depends on the participant's pair-wise sorting behaviour in order to avoid a strong top-down inXuence of superordinate concepts. In this respect, we argue that the method applied by Reed et al. (2004) facilitates a third-person-view and decisions based on declarative knowledge structures and thereby addresses general body semantics to a much stronger extent than the SDA method does.
Studies of movement expertise (e.g., Schack and Mechsner 2006; Bläsing et al. 2009 ) have shown that the SDA sorting procedure is well suited to reveal long term memory structures that are not exclusively declarative, like movement knowledge. Even though based on verbal labels, we argue that this method is more appropriate to address action-based body concepts than commonly applied approaches to body structural description or body image. Body structural description has often been associated with tasks such as pointing towards own body parts or corresponding body parts in pictures, however, this approach has been criticised by de Vignemont (2010) , who argues that such pointing tasks are likely to involve diVerent types of body representation and body-related spatial frames of reference in parallel. Previous studies (e.g., Schack 2004a) have shown that increasing motor expertise brings about increased diVerentiation of body postures. These studies investigated mental representations of functional movement structures, i.e., body parts were implicitly represented according to their movement-based functionality. In the current study, body structure is addressed directly, but in the context of action. In order to facilitate the access to an action-related body representation in our experiment, we included action verbs into our list of items. Hauk et al. (2004) had shown that reading action verbs describing limb-related actions activates areas in motor and premotor cortex that correspond to speciWc body parts. It has to be emphasized that studies of body structural description or body image have not applied tasks involving bodily actions or mental representations of actions triggered for example by action verbs, as in the paradigm used in our study.
The Wnding that the results of our study are in concordance with results of previous studies regarding the role of congenital phantoms (Brugger et al. 2000; Brugger and Funk 2007; Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) suggests that this representation of the body on the cognitive level might be mediated by knowledge structures comparable to the ones that underlie movement knowledge. This is supported by de Vignemont's (2010) deWnition of body schema according to which body schema includes longterm and short-term body representations, representations of the body as an eVector and as the goal of an action, and is exploited by the motor system at the diVerent stages of action programming, action prediction and sensory feedback to inform forward and inverse models in the motor control system.
Conclusion
Lately, several authors have criticized the strict diVerentiation implied by the customary dyadic and triadic taxonomies of body representation. De Vignemont (2010) points out that action-based body schema and body image(s) "interact all the time", whereas Carruthers (2008) proposes an alternative classiWcation. Berlucchi and Aglioti (2010) argue against maintaining the terms body schema and body image and favour the conception of "many bodies in the brain" that are "unlikely to be isomorphic with the body itself". The idea of redundant interacting body representations is strongly supported by Corradi-Dell'Acqua and Tessari (2010). De Vignemont et al. (2009) even provide evidence for a top-down inXuence of body part concepts on tactile integration. In the light of these statements and our previous studies of cognitive movement structures (Schack 2004a; Bläsing et al. 2009 ), we see the results of our study as evidence for a strong interaction of action-based and conceptual body representations on a functional level.
Taking into account the inXuence of C.L.'s functional adaptation to his bodily condition and the modiWed modularity of body representation, we conclude that body representation might be strongly inXuenced by action concepts rather than by actions or concepts on diVerent levels. This point, however, needs to be substantiated by further studies. Regarding A.Z., our results corroborate the Wndings of previous studies (e.g., Funk et al. 2005; Funk and Brugger 2008) and add the aspect that her congenital phantoms maintain the modularity of her body representation in the same way as a complete body does, even if its functionality is impaired, as in the paralysed participants of our study.
Finally, it has to be borne in mind, though, that with A.Z. and C.L. two individuals have been included in the study that diVer from others to a large extent and that generalization even to other amelic individuals is a diYcult issue. This might be especially true for A.Z., who as a tetramelic person with full congenital phantoms represents an extremely rare case.
